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Introduction 
 
During the summer of 2012, a political crisis developed in Romania, largely resulting 
from a power struggle between President Traian Băsescu and Prime Minister Victor Ponta.  
Although the conflict was borne of a disagreement about which of the two should represent 
Romania at EU Summits, it quickly escalated when Ponta attempted to depose Băsescu using 
tactics that undermined the power of the country’s Constitutional Court.i  In July, the European 
Commission (2012c) responded to the crisis decisively by issuing a report via the Cooperation 
and Verification Mechanism (CVM) detailing concerns and issuing urgent recommendations to 
the Romanian government; almost immediately, Mr. Ponta committed to implementation of 
those reforms (para. 4).  By the end of August, the power of the Constitutional Court had been 
restored.  On August 28, the Romanian parliament honored a ruling of the Constitutional Court 
that invalidated attempts to impeach Băsescu.ii In short, using the CVM report, the European 
Commission successfully pressured Mr. Ponta to reverse illiberal actions that his government 
had taken.    
 In Hungary, on the other hand, the EU has not been as successful.  At several points 
during the administration of current Prime Minister, the EU has expressed concerns to the 
Hungarian government regarding actions that they have taken that compromise the independence 
of the Constitutional Court, but such actions by the government have continued largely 
unchecked.iii  Initially, EU leverage attempts appeared somewhat successful in Hungary: after the 
European Parliament criticized elements of the new Hungarian Constitution in 2011, many 
illiberal elements of the Constitution were struck down or repealed.iv  The EU’s successes were 
only temporary, however.  In 2013, after the passage of the Fourth Amendment to the Hungarian 
Constitution, which, among other things, permanently eliminated the Constitutional Court’s 
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ability to review the constitutionality of fiscal legislation, Mr. Orbán’s only response to EU 
criticism was to deny allegations that the amendment compromised the Court’s independence.v   
 Comparisons between the EU’s success in Romania and failure in Hungary raise an 
important question: what explains the variation in outcomes given the EU’s attempts in both 
cases to compel a member state government to reverse illiberal actions? I argue that three factors 
are most important in explaining this variation.  First is trust: if the citizens in the targeted 
member state place a high level of trust in the EU and a relatively low level of trust in the 
national government, the government will be more likely to capitulate to EU demands for fear of 
paying high domestic political costs for defying the EU.  Second is friends in high places: if the 
government is protected from material sanctions by a powerful party group within the European 
Parliament, the EU will be less likely to use material sanctions against that member state. Third 
is domestic contention:  if the nature of the illiberal actions is such that the government has 
successfully curbed domestic political competition, the targeted state will be less likely to 
capitulate to EU demands, since they will have less reason to fear domestic electoral 
consequences of non-compliance or of incurring sanctions.   
A specific definition of illiberalism is crucial to my analysis.  Defining illiberalism in any 
concrete, measurable way is somewhat difficult, because “liberalism” is often defined in terms of 
broad, vague principles.  Specificity is crucial to my analysis, however, and I therefore define 
illiberalism as follows: an action is considered illiberal if it either (a) compromises the ability of 
government institutions to perform their functions or (b) compromises the ability of voters to 
hold government elites accountable.  In the Romanian and Hungarian cases in particular, illiberal 
actions have mostly taken the form of either (a) actions that compromise the independence and 
efficacy of the constitutional court or (b) actions that compromise political competition.  The 
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former is particularly important in the context of European parliamentary systems, because in 
systems in which the executive and legislative branches are combined, the constitutional court 
places perhaps the most important check on the government’s authority.  The latter is equally 
important in any democratic system. 
 I will preliminarily test my hypotheses through an analysis of the Romanian and 
Hungarian cases, which for now are the only ones available.  Applied to these cases, my analysis 
suggests the following: first, the Romanian government has been more inclined to capitulate to 
EU demands than the Hungarian government largely because the Romanian population’s 
relatively high trust in the EU gives the government reason to fear the domestic political costs of 
defying it. Second, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s strong alliance with the European 
People’s Party in the European Parliament has allowed his government to act with a fair amount 
of certainty that the EU will not invoke Article 7 TEU, its most powerful sanction, whereas the 
alliance of Romania’s Prime Minister Victor Ponta with the Party of European Socialists has not 
provided a similar guarantee. Third, the Hungarian government’s success in curbing domestic 
political competition has made them less sensitive to internal pressure and to EU demands, 
whereas this has not been a factor in Romania. 
 The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Section I is a brief overview of current 
literature on closely related topics, pointing out gaps in that literature and describing how my 
thesis contributes to it.  Section II provides an overview of the actions by the ruling parties that 
have undermined liberal democracy in both countries.  This helps us understand the nature and 
effectiveness of the EU’s response to those actions.  Section III looks at how well my hypotheses 
explain the outcomes in my two cases. The conclusion briefly discusses the implications of my 
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findings for future attempts by the EU to pressure a member government to reverse reforms that 
undermine liberal democracy.     
Section I: Literature Review 
 
It is important to review briefly the literature on what leverage mechanisms the EU has 
used and whether they have worked because the EU’s use of leverage mechanisms is central to 
my analysis.  Sketching this literature will also help me explain the gap that I help fill with this 
thesis.  Most literature on EU leverage has focused on domestic and EU-level factors that 
determine the EU’s ability to leverage gradual reform. However, little is known about the 
domestic factors that help determine whether or not the EU can use its leverage to compel 
member state governments to reverse new policies that undermine liberal democracy, such as the 
recent illiberal actions taken by the Romanian and Hungarian governments.   
EU Leverage in the Pre-Accession Period 
 The body of research on EU leverage mechanisms in the pre-accession period is 
important because it explains the EU’s strong track record in incentivizing domestic reform: 
Because the EU was, during the pre-accession period, “willing to monitor implementation and 
sanction non-compliance” with domestic political reforms, domestic political actors incurred 
great cost by not legitimately implementing reforms, and they were therefore willing to 
implement the EU’s reforms (Levitz and Pop-Eleches 2010, 472).  Most research on the EU’s 
leverage capabilities in the pre-accession period has been positive.  In particular, Vachudova 
(2005) argues that EU monitoring and conditionality created a “focal point for cooperation” of 
opposition parties in prospective member-states, causing those opposition parties to adopt pro-
EU positions (179).  As a result, when negative monitoring reports by the EU led to electoral 
costs for domestic elites, opposition parties came to power that were held accountable to 
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implementing EU reforms (179).  Writing specifically about Bulgaria and Romania, Noutcheva 
and Bechev (2008) argue that in spite of domestic factors that “obstructed reform in the sectors 
most susceptible to political influence and least likely to be reformed without external pressure,” 
the EU was able to use conditionality in those two countries to “[tilt] the political balance in 
favour of a consensus on pro-EU reforms” (114).   
Analysis of the effectiveness of EU conditionality is not universally positive, however; 
Hughes and Sasse (2003), for example, are critical of the “adhocism, inconsistency, and a stress 
on formal measures rather than substantive evaluation of implementation” that they argue 
constituted the EU’s monitoring of minority rights in prospective member states (1).  Regardless 
of assessments of the EU’s efficacy, however, the vast majority of literature on pre-accession 
leverage shares a focus on the EU’s ability to leverage gradual reform only.  
Post-Accession Leverage 
 Scholarly literature on post-accession leverage is less abundant and less conclusive than 
that on pre-accession leverage.  Most literature on post-accession leverage has focused on 
Romania and Bulgaria, because the EU has attempted to continue to leverage reform in those 
countries through the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism, which monitors progress on 
judicial reform, corruption, and organized crime (European Commission 2012c).1   
Assessment of the effectiveness of the CVM has been relatively positive as well.   
Broadly considering the issue of post-accession progress on democratic reforms in Bulgaria and 
Romania, Levitz and Pop-Eleches (2009) argue that the two countries have been successful in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 A detailed explanation of the Cooperation and Verification Mechanism can be found at 
http://ec.europa.eu/cvm/index_en.htm  
2 Although the President does not have an official party affiliation, since Article 84 of the 
Constitution of Romania bars the President from membership in a political party, Băsescu has 
traditionally been associated with the PDL.   
3 In addition to marginalizing the Constitutional Court, both Emergency Ordinances were not in 
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sustaining reforms made in the pre-accession period.  Writing shortly after Romanian and 
Bulgarian accession to the EU, Noutcheva and Bechev (2008) predicted the importance of 
“continued EU supervision and monitoring of the critical semireformed sectors in Bulgaria and 
Romania” (117).  Spendzharova and Vachudova (2011) argue that “the EU incentives that shape 
elite choices stem primarily from public monitoring by the European Commission of government 
performance and the possibility of sanctions by the EU” (39).  Similarly, Pridham (2006) 
suggests that both monitoring of reform progress and conditionality are necessary (186).  
Dimitrova (2010) argues that “the EU’s mechanisms for monitoring and sanctions can influence 
actors’ cost-benefit calculations” (145).  In an analysis that addresses the importance of 
monitoring by the EU rather than of leverage mechanisms more broadly, Levitz and Pop-Eleches 
(2010) indicate that monitoring is essential to ensure that “backsliding” on pre-accession reform 
progress does not occur; since EU funds have been a major incentive for Romania and Bulgaria 
to continue to reform, the EU must use monitoring to ensure that those funds are used properly 
and that there are consequences for improper use (478).  Andreev (2009) is more pessimistic, 
however; in his analysis of post-accession reform in Romania, he argues that “corruption has 
remained an enduring problem, while the EU bodies have continued to closely monitor the 
reform process in the country” (379).  All of this research, with the possible exception of 
Andreev (2009), suggests that the monitoring and leverage mechanism created by the EU 
through the CVM enables the EU to influence the activities of domestic political actors and 
domestic politics in general.   
 Like literature on pre-accession leverage, literature on the CVM has focused almost 
entirely on gradual reform.  This makes sense: until the recent passage of the new Hungarian 
Constitution and the 2012 Romanian Political Crisis, there had not been many notable cases in 
Loveland 8 
which the EU attempted to leverage member states to reverse illiberal actions.  These cases have 
therefore created a new opportunity to broaden the scope of research to focus on EU attempts to 
leverage reversal of illiberalism.   
Leverage in Hungary and Romania 
The academic debate about threats to liberal democracy in Hungary and also in 
Romania—and how EU membership has restrained them—is still in its developmental stages, 
since the illiberal actions taken by those two countries’ governments are so recent and—in the 
Hungarian case—ongoing.  In particular, the current literature lacks any thorough 
demonstrations of the factors particular to the targeted member state that may determine the 
EU’s success or failure; I intend to add to the current body of literature by addressing that issue.   
Early literature on the Hungarian and Romanian cases has mainly characterized the 
nature of the illiberal actions themselves: Scheppele (2013a), for example, describes Hungary as 
a “Frankenstate,” arguing that the Hungarian government has combined “the bits and pieces of 
perfectly reasonable democratic institutions in monstrous ways, much as Frankenstein’s monster 
was created from bits and pieces of other living things.  No one part is objectionable; the horror 
emerges from the combinations” (5).  Other early literature also analyzed the effectiveness of the 
threat of EU sanctions in the two cases: most notably, Pop-Eleches (2013) compares the two 
cases and determines that the threat of EU sanctions has been more effective in Romania than in 
Hungary, but does not test any hypotheses attempting to explain why that might be the case (11).   
 More recently, in-depth analysis of the two cases has emerged.  Sedelmeier (2014) offers 
the most comprehensive analysis of EU attempts to leverage reversal of illiberal actions.  
Sedelmeier’s (2014) analysis begins with an empirical demonstration of the factors that 
determine whether EU actors “support sanctions against Member states that breach democracy,” 
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through which he finds that “actors support sanctions either if they are committed to the values 
of liberal democracy (that is, have a GAL orientation) or if they are ideologically distant from 
the target government” (112).  Sedelmeier (2014) then turns to a discussion of the “effectiveness 
of EU instruments against democratic backsliding in Hungary and Romania,” in which he finds 
that “the main variation in the EU’s success is across countries,” but also that “cross-issue 
variation within countries supports the material leverage hypothesis,” meaning that the evidence 
supports the notion that “target governments carry out domestic changes demanded by the EU if 
the costs of threatened EU sanctions exceed the domestic adjustment costs” (114-117).  
Sedelmeier (2014) also demonstrates that social pressure can be effective even without the threat 
of material sanctions if domestic conditions are favorable, but he does not attempt to determine 
the specific domestic conditions that determine the EU’s success or failure (105).  In short, 
although Sedelmeier’s analysis supports the notion that both material leverage and social 
pressure can be effective depending on EU-level and country-specific factors, it does not 
demonstrate what specific factors particular to the target member state may determine the EU’s 
success or failure.  In this thesis, I attempt to fill that gap.     
Section II: Background 
 It is important to explain briefly the illiberal actions that were taken by the Romanian and 
Hungarian governments in order to understand the nature of the two countries’ breaches of 
liberal democracy and that of the EU’s response in each case.   
Romania 
My analysis of the Romanian case is primarily concerned with one set of events—termed 
by the media the “Romanian political crisis of 2012”—that occurred during the summer of that 
year.  That set of events can be summarized as follows: 
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Following Victor Ponta’s appointment as Romanian Prime Minister, the country entered 
a state of cohabitation: Ponta, of the Social Democratic Party (PSD), shared the executive with 
President Traian Băsescu of the centre-right Democratic Liberal Party (PDL).2  The two leaders’ 
political differences developed into a direct conflict for the first time in June 2012, when they 
quarreled over who should represent Romania at meetings of the European Council. vi  Although 
the President had traditionally represented Romania in the EU, Ponta argued that the EU’s 
increased focus on economic affairs meant the Prime Minister would be the more appropriate 
representative.vii  Just ahead of the European Council meeting in question, the Romanian 
Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the President representing the country at the meeting.viii  
Ponta disregarded that ruling, however, citing pro-Băsescu bias on the part of the Court as his 
reason.ix  Shortly thereafter, the conflict ended when Băsescu conceded to Ponta the right to 
attend the summit.x 
Although Ponta’s disregard for the Constitutional Court’s decision is concerning, more 
notable were his government’s subsequent efforts to impeach President Băsescu, which included 
several actions that subverted the Constitutional Court’s authority and independence.  First, in 
order to prevent the Constitutional Court from hindering the impeachment process, Ponta issued 
two Emergency Ordinances, numbers 38/2012 and 41/2012.  The former effectively stripped the 
Constitutional Court of its ability to rule on the constitutionality of parliamentary decisions 
(European Commission 2012a, 4); the latter amended the rules governing a referendum, 
changing the threshold for successful impeachment from two thirds of all eligible voters to two-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Although the President does not have an official party affiliation, since Article 84 of the 
Constitution of Romania bars the President from membership in a political party, Băsescu has 
traditionally been associated with the PDL.   
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thirds of votes cast (Venice Commission 2012, 4).3 Additionally, the European Commission 
notes several other actions taken by the Ponta government—such as the neglect to publish 
Constitutional Court decisions in the Official Journal—as attempts to marginalize the Court 
(European Commission 2012b, 7).  In short, although the Constitutional Court was not the Ponta 
government’s main target, their efforts to marginalize the Court in order to impeach Băsescu 
demonstrate the extent to which they were willing to compromise liberalism to achieve political 
goals. 
As the Romanian Political Crisis intensified, the European Commission officially raised 
concerns about the Romanian government’s actions in the July 2012 Cooperation and 
Verification Mechanism Report.  In that report, the Commission both criticized the government’s 
actions and enumerated specific recommendations (European Commission 2012b).  The 
Romanian government’s progress on implementing those recommendations serves as a valuable 
benchmark for assessing whether the Romanian government legitimately reversed the illiberal 
actions that it took.  Very shortly after the publication of the report, Ponta committed to 
Commission President José Manuel Barroso to implement the recommended reforms (European 
Commission 2012c, para. 4). A little over one month later, early signs indicated that the Ponta 
government was taking steps to restore the Constitutional Court’s power: on August 28, the 
government officially honored a Constitutional Court ruling that invalidated the government’s 
attempts to impeach Băsescu and allowed Băsescu to return to his post.xi  In January 2013, the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 In addition to marginalizing the Constitutional Court, both Emergency Ordinances were not in 
line with Constitutional requirements governing the use of Emergency Ordinances.  Article 115 
of the Constitution of Romania governs the use of emergency ordinances by the Government.  
Article 115.4 dictates that “the Government may only adopt emergency ordinances in 
exceptional cases.”  Article 115.6 dictates that “emergency ordinances cannot be adopted in the 
field of constitutional laws, or affect the status of fundamental institutions of the state, the rights, 
freedoms, and duties stipulated in the Constitution, the electoral rights, and cannot establish steps 
for transferring assets to public property forcibly.”   
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Commission issued another CVM report in which it qualitatively assessed the progress that the 
Romanian government had made in following its recommendations (European Commission 
2013). The following table summarizes the January 2013 report’s assessment of progress on 
those recommendations that specifically address the 2012 Political Crisis:4 
Table 1 
Recommendation Action Recommendation 
Satisfied? 
Repeal Emergency Ordinance no. 
38/2012 
De facto reinstatement of Constitutional Court’s 
power to check the constitutionality of 
parliamentary decisions  
Yes 
Repeal Emergency Ordinance no. 
41/2012 
Repealed officially Yes 
Respect Constitutional Requirements 
Governing Use of Emergency Decrees5 
Verbal commitment by the Romanian 
Government; since July 2012, emergency 
ordinances have only been used in accordance 
with Constitutional requirements 
Yes 
Implement all decisions of the 
Constitutional Court 
Respect for Constitutional Court ruling on the 
July 29 referendum; no further instances of 
refusal to comply with Constitutional Court 
rulings 
Yes 
Publish all decisions of the 
Constitutional Court in the Official 
Journal6  
Since July 2012, decisions of the Constitutional 
Court have been published in the Official 
Journal 
Yes 
Require all political parties and 
government authorities to respect the 
independence of the judiciary 
No action taken No 
According to the Commission’s assessment, the Romanian government successfully complied 
with all but one of the recommendations listed in Table 1.7  Additionally, it is important to note 
that the only recommendation listed above with which the Romanian government did not comply 
is also the only one that recommends broad reform rather than specific, measurable action.  In 
every instance in which the Commission recommended that the Romanian government take 
specific, measurable steps to reverse illiberal actions, the government did so.   
Hungary !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 All information in this table is derived from European Commission (2013), pp. 2-3.   
5 See footnote 4.      
6 Article 147.1 of the Constitution of Romania dictates that “decisions of the Constitutional 
Court shall be published in the Official Gazette of Romania.”   
7 Although the table does not list all recommendations made by the Commission, it does list all 
recommendations that refer specifically to the 2012 Political Crisis. 
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Illiberal actions taken by the Fidesz government in Hungary are both more varied and 
more numerous than those taken by the Romanian government.  For simplicity’s sake, however, 
they can be consolidated into two major events: the passage of the new Hungarian Constitution 
in January 2012 and the passage of the Fourth Amendment to that Constitution in March 2013.  
In this section, I will describe both events, the criticism and recommendations issued by the EU 
in each instance, and the way in which the Hungarian government responded to the EU.  In order 
to avoid a laundry list, however, I will not attempt to describe all illiberal actions taken by the 
Hungarian government.  I will instead focus only on those actions that (a) compromised the 
independence and efficacy of the Constitutional Court or (b) marginalized domestic political 
opposition.  The former will set the stage for my analysis by accurately portraying the scale of 
the Fidesz government’s actions and will highlight the parallels between the Romanian and 
Hungarian cases.  The latter is important to the assessment of my third hypothesis, which 
specifically concerns marginalization of political opposition.  
 The first notable illiberal actions taken by the Hungarian government were compiled into 
the new Hungarian Constitution and related legislation, which went into effect on January 1, 
2012. xii  One of the most concerning pieces of legislation related to the Constitution was the Act 
on Transitional Provisions of Hungary’s Fundamental Law, which eliminated the Constitutional 
Court’s ability to review the constitutionality of fiscal legislation; although the Constitution itself 
eliminated that power of the Constitutional Court at times when Hungary’s national debt is 
greater than half the country’s GDP, the Act on Transitional Provisions extends that elimination 
indefinitely (Bánkuti, et al. 2012, 12).  Additionally, as described by Bánkuti, et al. (2012), the 
Hungarian Parliament passed the Act on the Constitutional Court, which placed two further 
limits on the independence and efficacy of the Constitutional Court.  First, it created a process 
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for nominating and appointing judges to the Constitutional Court that allows the majority party 
to independently select judges without the support of or consultation with the opposition (62).  
Second, it abolished a process called actio popularis through which any Hungarian citizen could 
previously initiate review of a law by the Constitutional Court, regardless of whether the 
petitioner was actually affected by the law in question (56).   
 In response to the above and other illiberal actions taken by the Hungarian government, 
EU institutions and other international and supranational actors expressed concerns, issued 
criticisms, and made recommendations.  Perhaps the most notable set of EU criticisms and 
recommendations came in the form of the July 5 2011 Resolution of the European Parliament, 
which, among other things, recommended that the Hungarian government reinstate the 
Constitutional Court’s power to review fiscal legislation (European Parliament 2011, sec. 1).   In 
the year that followed initial criticisms of the new Hungarian Constitution, the EU’s efforts 
seemed to be at least somewhat effective.  According to Kim Lane Scheppele’s assessment, the 
Hungarian government did, in fact, “[appear] to modify some of the most offending reforms,” 
and the Constitutional Court—despite its weakened position—successfully “[struck] down many 
of the most worrisome laws passed by the Fidesz party.”xiii  Additionally, Orbán made a visit to 
the European Parliament in January of 2012; although his response to Hungary’s critics in the 
EU was relatively aggressive, he explicitly committed to work with the EU to resolve issues with 
the Constitution and related legislation.xiv  In short, criticisms and recommendations issued by 
the EU in response to the Hungarian Constitution seemed at least somewhat successful at 
leveraging the reversal of the government’s illiberal actions.   
 That did not mark the end of illiberalism in Hungary, however.  In March 2013, the 
Hungarian government passed the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which further 
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compromised the independence and efficacy of the Constitutional Court.  In her testimony to the 
Helsinki Commission, Kim Lane Scheppele (2013b) identifies three ways in which the March 
2013 amendment compromises Court’s power.  First, the amendment nullifies all pre-2012 
Constitutional Court rulings; Scheppele (2013b) notes that this is problematic in that it “annuls 
primarily the cases that defined and protected constitutional rights” (para. 35).  Second, the 
amendment makes permanent the provision of the Constitution barring the Constitutional Court 
from ruling on fiscal legislation (para. 34). Finally, the amendment eliminates the ability of the 
court to “[review] constitutional amendments for substantive conflicts with constitutional 
principles;” this final change is particularly problematic because the Fidesz Party controls a two-
thirds majority of Parliament, which gives the party the power to amend the Constitution 
independently (para. 30).  
Additionally, the Fourth Amendment included several attempts to marginalize domestic 
political competition.  In her March 19, 2013, testimony to the Helsinki Commission, Kim Lane 
Scheppele described several of those actions in detail.  Of particular importance are the 
following four changes made by the Fidesz government.  First, the Fidesz government gave the 
Fidesz-appointed president of the National Judicial Office the power to reassign any case in the 
Hungarian court system to a new court, meaning that any case involving members of opposition 
parties could be assigned to Fidesz-friendly courts (Scheppele 2013b).  Second, the Fidesz 
government has engaged in significant gerrymandering of electoral districts (Scheppele 2013b).  
Third, the Fidesz government has banned political advertising in any media other than public 
broadcasting controlled by the Fidesz media board (Scheppele 2013b).  Finally, the Fidesz 
government has ensured that, even if the opposition wins a majority in the upcoming election, 
the Fidesz-controlled budget council will have the power to veto any budget that the new 
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government passes, which would in turn give the President of Hungary the option to dissolve 
Parliament and hold new elections (Scheppele 2013b).  In short, the Hungarian government 
made it very difficult for opposition parties to win a majority in future elections.    
 Although numerous criticisms were mounted against the March 2013 amendment in the 
immediate aftermath of its passage, the most comprehensive criticism did not come until nearly 
four months after the passage of the amendment.  On June 25, 2013, the European Parliament 
released a report, known as the “Tavares Report,” condemning numerous actions taken by the 
Hungarian Government and making multiple recommendations for reform (European Parliament 
2013).  Among those recommendations were several concerning the Constitutional Court 
specifically, including recommendations to restore the Constitutional Court’s ability to review 
constitutional amendments, restore pre-2012 case law, and strive for a non-partisan process for 
appointing judges to the Court (European Parliament 2013, sec. 71).  Additionally, the report 
included several recommendations related to marginalization of political opposition, such as a 
recommendation to invite the Venice Commission to review Hungary’s electoral laws and to 
ensure bipartisan representation on the National Election Committee (European Parliament 2013, 
sec. 71).  
 Prime Minister Orbán’s response to criticisms of the Fourth Amendment was quite 
different from his previous response to criticisms of the Constitution itself.  Perhaps most 
emblematic of Orbán’s response to criticisms of the Fourth Amendment is his speech delivered 
to the European Parliament on July 3, 2013, in which he denied the Tavares Report’s allegations, 
called the report unfair, and refused to commit to its recommendations.xv     
 It is important to note that the Tavares Report is not merely a condemnation of Hungary; 
as Scheppele (2013c) explains, it also “puts a very clever system of monitoring and assessment 
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in place” by creating a committee of Commission, European Council, and European Parliament 
members to monitor Hungary and creating a “Copenhagen Commission” of non-political experts 
to monitor and assess Hungary’s compliance with the recommendations of the report (para. 13-
16).  To date, however, even though the report makes the possibility of sanctions explicit, it has 
not successfully pressured the Hungarian government to comply with the recommendations of 
the report or even convinced the government to nominally commit to working to resolve the 
EU’s concerns.      
Section IV: Analysis 
 
In this section, I test my three hypotheses with respect to the Romanian and Hungarian 
cases.  My three hypotheses are described in the introduction and are restated here: First, if the 
citizens in the member state in question place a high level of trust in the EU and a relatively low 
level of trust in the national government, the member state government will be more likely to 
capitulate to EU demands for fear of domestic political costs of defying the EU.  Second, if the 
member state government in question is protected from material sanctions by a powerful party 
group within the European Parliament, the EU will be less likely and less able to impose material 
sanctions against that member state. Third, if the nature of the illiberal actions is such that the 
government has successfully curbed domestic political competition, the member state 
government will be less likely to capitulate to EU demands, since they will have less reason to 
fear domestic electoral consequences of non-compliance or of incurring sanctions.   
My three hypotheses are based on the assumption that criticism and recommendations 
from the EU can serve as an effective leverage mechanism in two situations: first, if domestic 
political conditions are such that defiance of the EU would directly lead to domestic political 
consequences for the target government; and second, if the EU has material sanctions “up its 
Loveland 18 
sleeve” that it can use to punish non-compliance with recommendations (i.e., implied material 
consequences of non-compliance).  Inversely, if neither exists, criticisms and recommendations 
from the EU will likely fail as a leverage mechanism.   
Hypothesis I: The Trust Gap 
One factor that predicts whether or not the EU is successful in leveraging a target 
member state to reverse illiberal actions is what I term the “trust gap,” or the extent to which the 
voting populace in each country places more trust in the EU than in the national government.   In 
both Hungary and Romania, the trust gap has generally been positive (i.e., the populace has 
placed more trust in the EU than in the national government).xvi   Indeed, this has traditionally 
been the case throughout the EU: from 2004 through 2013, the populace of the EU as a whole 
has consistently indicated a greater level of trust in the EU than in their respective national 
governments.xvii  What should be considered, therefore, is not the existence of a positive trust 
gap, but the size of the trust gap.  Specifically, I consider the size of the trust gap at the point in 
time closest to the time at which the EU criticized illiberal actions taken by the member state 
government in question. 
The trust gap is important because it reflects factors that would inform government 
leaders deciding whether or not to stand up to EU criticism – and defy EU pressure.  The logic is 
relatively straightforward: measured in terms of domestic popularity, it would be costly for a 
relatively unpopular, untrusted government to defy a relatively popular, trusted EU; it would be 
less costly for a relatively popular, trusted government to defy a relatively unpopular, untrusted 
EU.  I hypothesize, therefore, that when the trust gap is both large and positive (i.e., the populace 
places significantly more trust in the EU than in the government), the government is more likely 
to respond positively to EU criticisms and recommendations. 
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Figures 1 and 2 are based on Eurobarometer public opinion polls conducted between 
2007 and 2013.xviii  Eurobarometer polls are conducted biannually: once near the middle of the 
year and once near the end.  Figure 1 tracks the level of trust that the Hungarian and Romanian 
populaces place in their national governments and in the EU, respectively.8  Figure 2 tracks the 
trust gap for both countries over that time period.  Values in Figure 2 represent the difference 
between trust in the EU and trust in the national government.  For example, in May of 2012 the 
trust gap in Romania was 21% because 27% of the populace indicated trust in the national 
government and 48% of the populace indicated trust in the EU (48-27=21).   
Figure 1: Trust in the EU and Trust in National Governments9 
 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 The data represented in these charts represents answers collected through biannual 
Eurobarometer polls to the questions “For each of the following media and institutions, please 
tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: The (Nationality) Government” and “For each 
of the following media and institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it: 
The European Union.”  Percentages in Figure 1 correspond to the percentage of the sample in 
each country that answered “Tend to trust” to those questions.  Percentages in Figure 2 
correspond to the percentage of the sample in each country that answered “Tend to trust for the 
EU” minus the percentage of the sample that answered “Tend to trust” for the (Nationality) 
Government.   
9 All data in Figures 1 and 2 is derived from Eurobarometer polling results, accessible at 
http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm  
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Figure 2: The Trust Gap 
 
Hungary 
The two important points to consider for Hungary are November 2011 and May 2013, 
because these are the two points closest to times at which the EU attempted to leverage the 
Hungarian government to reverse its illiberal actions.  In November 2011, the trust gap in 
Hungary was at 21%, the largest since the Fidesz government took power, and it had risen 
steadily over the past year.  Trust in the EU among Hungarians was relatively average for 
Hungary (47%).  Trust in the Hungarian government was at its lowest point since the Fidesz 
government had taken power (26%) and had been falling for the past year.   
 As discussed in Section II, above, in January of 2012—amid criticism and threats of 
infringement proceedings from the EU—Viktor Orbán visited European Parliament, where he 
delivered a speech assuring members of Parliament that the issues that the European Union had 
with the Hungarian Constitution and related legislation would be resolved.  This response aligns 
with my hypothesis in two ways.  First, as predicted by the existence of a relatively large trust 
gap, Orbán responded positively to the EU’s criticisms and demands.  Second, the nature of his 
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response suggests that he made it with public opinion in mind: it is relatively unusual for a 
government leader to visit European Parliament, and his trip garnered significant attention in the 
news media.   
 In May of 2013, the Eurobarometer indicates that the trust gap in Hungary was at 16%, 
its lowest point in two years, and had been steadily shrinking since November 2011.  Trust in the 
Hungarian Government was relatively high (31%) and had risen consistently over the last two 
polling periods.  Trust in the European Union was, again, relatively average for Hungary, at 
47%.   
 As discussed in Section II, perhaps the most notable criticism of the Hungarian 
Government issued by the EU is the so-called “Tavares Report,” approved by the European 
Parliament on June 25, 2013.  In response to that report, Orbán again visited European 
Parliament, but the speech he delivered was starkly different from that which he gave in January 
2012: calling the report politically motivated and unfair, he refused to commit to the 
recommended reforms.  Again, Orbán’s response to EU criticism aligns with my hypothesis: the 
trust gap was small and shrinking, and Orbán actively defied the EU in his response to criticism.  
Romania 
 The most important point for Romania is May 2012, because that is the point closest to 
the time at which the EU attempted to leverage reversal of illiberal actions there.  In May 2012, 
the trust gap in Romania (21%) was relatively small for Romania, but relatively large when 
compared with that of the EU as a whole, which stood at 3% at the time and has fluctuated 
between 3% and 10% over the last several years.  Trust in the Romanian government was at 
27%, and trust in the EU was relatively average for Romania, at 48%.   
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 As discussed in Section II, after the EU issued the July 2012 CVM report that criticized 
the Romanian Government and made numerous recommendations, Prime Minister Ponta 
responded by committing to implement the reforms recommended by the EU; by the release of 
the next CVM report in January 2013, Ponta had, for the most part, made good on his promise.  
The Romanian Government’s response is also in line with my hypothesis that a large trust gap 
increases the likelihood that the targeted government will respond positively to EU criticism.   
Hypothesis II: Political Alliances 
Another factor that determines whether or not the EU has substantial leverage on a 
government that appears to be undermining liberal democracy is whether or not the ruling party 
leaders are being protected by a strong party organization in the European Parliament.  The EU’s 
most powerful sanction is Article 7 TEU, which allows the EU to suspend a member state’s 
voting rights on the Council when it is determined that there is a “clear risk of a breach by a 
member state of the values referred to in Article 2.” (Treaty on European Union, Article 7).  In 
order for Article 7 to be invoked, the European Parliament must approve the measure “by a two-
thirds majority of the votes cast, representing the majority of its component Members” (Treaty 
on European Union, Article 7).  If a strong European party organization is protecting the target 
government in the European Parliament, then the EU does not have its most powerful material 
leverage mechanism “up its sleeve,” eliminating this important source of pressure.   
Prime Minister Orbán is an influential member of the European People’s Party (EPP), the 
single largest party in European Parliament.  The EPP currently controls 274 of the European 
Parliament’s 766 seats, which amounts to roughly 36% of the body.  It would therefore be 
impossible for the European Parliament to invoke Article 7 without the support or abstention of 
at least some members of the EPP.  As Sedelmeier (2014) observes, the EPP has indicated that it 
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does not support sanctions—including the invocation of Article 7—against Hungary (112).  
There are several reasons this may be the case.  Fist, although Orbán’s current premiership only 
began in 2010, he has been a prominent important figure in European politics and in the EPP for 
over a decade.  Additionally, as Sedelmeier (2014) notes, TAN-aligned 
(traditional/authoritarian/nationalist) parties such as the EPP generally only support sanctions 
against their political opponents (112).  Regardless of the reasons that the EPP chooses to protect 
Orbán, however, their protection greatly reduces the EU’s leverage capabilities in Hungary.  To 
be clear, the important factor here is not simply that Orbán has a strong alliance with the EPP.  
What is important is that Orbán has an alliance with a party with enough representation in 
European Parliament to block invocation of Article 7, and that party has indicated that it does not 
support sanctions against Hungary (Sedelmeier 2014, 112).  In short, because the EPP will use its 
clout in the European Parliament to protect the Hungarian government, it would be very difficult 
for the Parliament to invoke Article 7 against Hungary.  This is important because it allows 
Orbán’s government to act with a fair degree of certainty that the European Union will not 
actually invoke Article 7, even if Hungary does not comply with its recommendations and 
continues to breach liberal democracy.  When responding to the Tavares Report, for example, 
even though the report specifically threatens the invocation of Article 7, Orbán was able to 
actively defy his critics in European Parliament with a virtual guarantee that actual invocation 
was not likely.   
The case is not the same for Ponta’s government in Romania.  Although he is a 
prominent member of the Party of European Socialists, Ponta cannot be confident that the 
European Parliament will not approve the invocation of Article 7 for two reasons.  First, the 
Socialists only control 194 seats in European Parliament, meaning that they would not be able to 
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prevent the invocation of Article 7 unless joined by other parties in abstaining or voting against 
invocation.  Second, as Sedelmeier (2014) observes, because the Party of European Socialists is 
GAL-aligned (green/alternative/libertarian), they would approve sanctions against Romania 
because of their commitment to the values of liberal democracy, regardless of their alliance with 
Ponta (112).  Ponta’s positive response to EU criticism therefore supports this hypothesis as well.   
Hypothesis III: Domestic Political Competition 
 Finally, I hypothesize that the EU’s leverage diminishes when the target government is 
able to restrict political competition and marginalize political opposition parties.  As explained 
above, when deciding how to respond to EU criticism and recommendations, it is logical for 
target governments to consider possible domestic political consequences of defying the EU or 
incurring EU sanctions.  If domestic political opposition is already weakened by illiberal actions, 
however, the possibility of domestic political consequences is reduced.  Therefore, in situations 
in which the government has successfully marginalized domestic political opposition, the 
government does not have to tread as carefully as they otherwise would when responding to EU 
criticism and recommendations, since they are somewhat insulated from possible electoral 
consequences of their actions.   
 Through the Fourth Amendment, the Hungarian government took several actions, 
described in Section II, above, that limited the power of opposition parties.  In short, Fidesz has 
taken significant steps to ensure that opposition parties will not gain power in future elections 
and that, even if they do gain power, measures are in place to allow Fidesz to return to power. 
These actions that protect the Fidesz party from electoral defeat in the future effectively allow 
the government to operate under a set of assumptions that is unavailable in a healthy liberal 
democracy: the Fidesz government is able to respond to EU criticisms and recommendations 
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with the knowledge that even if criticism from the EU negatively affects public perception of the 
party and even if the EU does impose sanctions, the party would be insulated from the full brunt 
of domestic political consequences because they have created an uneven playing field.  This 
allows Fidesz to respond negatively to EU criticism and recommendations with less fear of 
domestic political consequences than they would have if operating under normal conditions of 
healthy political competition.   
 This hypothesis can be tested in the Hungarian case by comparing the government’s 
response to criticism of the Constitution in 2012 to its response to criticism of the Fourth 
Amendment in 2013, because political opposition had not yet been successfully marginalized in 
the first case and had been marginalized in the second. As described in Section II, in 2012—
before opposition parties had been significantly weakened—Orbán responded positively to EU 
criticism, committing to resolve  concerns with the new Hungarian Constitution.  In the summer 
of 2013—after the Fourth Amendment had weakened political opposition—Orbán responded to 
the Tavares Report by denying the report’s allegations and refusing to commit to recommended 
reforms.  These findings support my hypothesis: when operating under normal conditions of 
healthy political competition, Orbán responded positively to EU criticism and recommendations; 
when operating under abnormal conditions in which political opposition had been weakened, 
Orbán responded negatively. 
 Although the Romanian government attempted to consolidate power in the summer of 
2012, they were not as drastic or as successful as the Hungarian government in attempts to 
marginalize opposition parties.  Thus, when the EU issued the July 2012 CVM report, the 
Romanian government was operating under normal conditions of healthy political competition.  
As described in Section II, Ponta responded to that report by committing to the recommended 
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reforms.  This, too, is consistent with my hypothesis: when operating under normal conditions of 
healthy political competition, Ponta responded positively to EU criticism and recommendations. 
Summary 
The table below summarizes my findings with respect to all three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis Country Finding Hypothesis 
Supported (1) 
or not 
supported (0) 
Hypothesis 1: Trust Gap Hungary When a large trust gap existed, Orbán 
government responded positively to 
the EU; when a small trust gap existed, 
Orbán government responded 
negatively to the EU  
1 
Romania A large trust gap existed; Ponta 
responded positively to EU criticism 
1 
Hypothesis 2: Political 
Alliances 
Hungary Orbán government has a strong 
alliance with the EPP, a party that is 
willing and able to block Article 7 
invocation in EP; Orbán government 
responded negatively to EU criticism 
1 
Romania Ponta government has a strong alliance 
with the S&D, a party that is unwilling 
and unable to block Article 7 
invocation in EP; Ponta government 
responded positively to EU criticism 
1 
Hypothesis 3: Domestic 
Political Competition 
Hungary Orbán government used methods that 
successfully marginalized domestic 
political opposition; Orbán government 
responded negatively to EU criticism 
1 
Romania Ponta government used methods that 
did not successfully marginalize 
domestic political competition; Ponta 
government responded positively to 
EU criticism 
1 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
At first glance, the Romanian and Hungarian cases paint a bleak picture of the EU’s post-
accession leverage capabilities.  The fact that the EU failed in Hungary might suggest that the 
EU’s leverage mechanisms are relatively weak, especially in cases of such extensive assault on 
liberal democracy as that seen in Hungary.  I argue that this is not the case.  I provide 
preliminary evidence that a specific constellation of factors peculiar to Hungary caused the EU to 
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fail in the Hungarian case.  Without Hungary’s specific combination of domestic social 
conditions (i.e. a small trust gap) that allowed the government to defy the EU, a relationship with 
the EPP that protected Hungary from Article 7, and marginalization of political opposition, the 
EU would likely have been more successful.  Only when all three of these factors existed in 
combination was Hungary able to defy the EU with impunity.  In short, the fact that the EU only 
failed under particular circumstances in Hungary suggests that the EU’s failure might best be 
considered an exceptional and unusual case rather than an embodiment of systemic failures of 
EU leverage. 
 Furthermore, my analysis suggests that it would be very difficult for other countries to 
follow the “Orbán playbook,” since the factors that I argue are important are generally outside of 
the government’s control.  Although  governments may be able to influence public opinion, they 
cannot control it, and the trust gap is therefore likely to fluctuate beyond the government’s 
control.  Similarly, although governments can work to build relationships with powerful 
European Parliament factions, building a relationship strong enough that it virtually guarantees 
protection from Article 7 invocation is difficult and took Viktor Orbán over a decade.  Finally, 
although other governments can attempt to marginalize domestic political opposition, it is 
unlikely that they would be able to do so as extensively as Hungary did, since Hungary’s ability 
to so fundamentally alter the electoral landscape can largely be attributed to its two-thirds 
supermajority, which allowed Fidesz to pass legislation and amend the constitution without any 
opposition support.  In short, although other EU member states may attempt to copy Orbán in the 
future, they are unlikely to be as successful as Orbán’s government has been.   
 Reality and perception are very different, however, and it is likely that the Hungarian 
case will cause the EU and international actors to view future breaches of liberal democracy with 
Loveland 28 
increased skepticism, even if it is unlikely that future illiberal governments will be as successful 
as Orbán’s government.  This is not a bad thing, because it will lead European and international 
actors to take illiberal actions by EU member states more seriously.  It is in this, perhaps, that the 
EU’s failure in Hungary has a silver lining: by showing the danger of failing to respond 
decisively to breaches of liberal democracy, the Hungarian case may cause European actors to 
respond more quickly and more decisively in the future.   
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